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SEPTEMBER, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-ONE
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great
cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because
they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them
the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound interstitial change in the
very tissue of the law."--MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.
Law offices seeking the services of recent graduates of this School should Com-
municate with the Dean. The School endeavors to place its graduates in desirable
positions and is frequently in a position to assist members of the Bar by recommend-
ing competent young lawyers, who desire to make a change in their professional work.
NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTRU-
MENTALITIES-Taxation of Profits Arising from the Sale of State or Municipal
Bonds.-Willcuts v. Bunn.1
In 1919 and 1920, plaintiff purchased certain bonds issued by various counties and
cities in the state of Minnesota. In 1924, he sold these bonds at a profit, upon which
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue levied an income tax. Plaintiff paid the tax,
under protest, and claimed a refund on the ground that the tax was illegal. His claim
was rejected, and he brought suit to recover the tax money. The District Court
held that the tax was invalid.2 The Cii'cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the District Court,3 but on appeal to the United States Supreme ;Court, the tax
was held to be valid.
In order to adequately discuss the problem involved in levying an income tax
upon the profits arising from the sale of state and municipal bonds, certain well
established principles must be considered. It is well settled that the Federal govern-
ment cannot tax the agents or instrumentalities of the state.4 This is true although
there is no express constitutional provision against such taxation. Although both
the state and Federal governments exist within the same territorial limits, each is
separate and distinct and acts independently of the other, so that the operations of one
1. 51 S. Ct. 125 (1931). 4. Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S.
2. Bunn v. Willcuts, 29 Fed. (2nd) 132 (D. 1, 23 S. Ct. 1, 47 L. Ed. 49 (1902); United
C. 1928). States v. Railroad Company, 17 Wall, 322
3. Willcuts v. Bunn, 35 Fed. (2nd) 29 (C. (1872); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 201,.
C.A. 1929). Ed. 122 (1870).
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should not be interfered with by the exercise of the taxing power of the other. The
rule rests upon the law of self preservation. If the tax levied by the Federal govern-
ment is to be held invalid it must interfere in some substantial way with the powers
of the state. 5 It cannot be said that every person who uses his property or derives
a profit in his dealings with the state thereby secures himself immunity from taxation
on the theory that he or his property is an instrumentality of the state within the
meaning of the general rule.
6
It is also a well established principle that the Federal government cannot tax
bonds issued by the state or its subdivisions 7 or the interest arising therefrom, 8 and
also that the state cannot tax bonds issued by the Federal government 9 or the interest
arising from such bonds.10 A tax upon the bonds of one government, or a tax upon
the interest arising from the bonds, which is considered the same as a tax upon the
bonds themselves, impedes the exercise of the borrowing power of the government,
and, for that reason is invalid. Such a tax constitutes a burden upon the operations of
the government, which, if carried far enough, right prove destructive.
It has been definitely decided, however, that a state, in levying an inheritance tax,
may lawfully measure the amount of the tax by considering the value of Federal securities
as a part of the estate,'1 and the Federal government, in levying an estate tax, may
tax the value of state and municipal bonds as part of the estate,' 2 Of course, an in-
heritance tax is not analogous to a tax upon the bonds themselves or a tax upon the
income from the bonds, because the former is a tax upon the privilege of transmission
or succession, and not a direct tax, whereas the latter is a tax upon the property itself.
With the foregoing principles in mind, the question presented is: May the Federal
government levy an income tax upon the profits arising from the sale of state or
municipal bonds, or is such a tax within the general rule already stated that the Federal
government cannot tax the state's agents or instrumentalities? The District Court
and Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the latter was true and hence that the tax
was invalid. Those two courts were of the opinion that such a tax was an interference
in a substantial degree with the exercise of the borrowing power of the state. Their
theory was that in the performance of its governmental functions, the state requires
money; that such money is procured by offering for sale to the investing public
the bonds or obligations of the state; that a tax on the bonds themselves or their
interest makes them less attractive on the market; and that, if the public knew that the
gain to be realized from the sale of such bonds was subject to a Federal tax, it
would tend to discourage the purchase of such securities, rendering them less salable,
and would, therefore, cause a reduction in the selling price of the bonds, thus ma-
terially interfering with the borrowing power of the state. The United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion handed down by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, reached a contrary
result, 'and held the tax valid, thus holding that there was no substantial interference
with the exercise of any power of the state.
It would seem that the decision reached by the Supreme Court is the better reason-
ing. Of course, it must be conceded that the difference between the taxation of in-
5. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269, U. S. (1894).
514, 46 S. Ct. 172, 70 L. Ed. 384 (1926). 9. Home Savings Hank v. Des Moines, 205
6, Ibid at 522, 523. U. S. 503, 27 S. Ct. 571, 51 L. Ed.. 901 (1907).
7. National Life Ins. Co. v. U. S., 277 U. 10. Macallen v, Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620
S. 508 (1928); Mercantile Bank v. New York, (1929).
121 U. S. 138, 75 S. Ct. 826, 30L. Ed. 895 11. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20
(1886). S. Ct. 829, 44 L. Ed. 998 (1900).
8. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and .Trust Co., 12. Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U. S. 384, 12
157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39L. Ed. 759 S. Ct. 324, 66 L. Ed. 676 (1922).
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terest from bonds and the taxation of the profits arising from the sale of the bonds
is largely a question of degree. But there seems to be sufficient distinction to hold
that, in the one case, the tax is invalid, and, in the other case, the tax is valid. After
the bonds have been issued by the state or its subdivision, and sold on the market,
their sale by a purchaser is a transaction which is distinct from, and entirely uncon-
nected with, the contract made by the state in the bonds themselves, and the profits
from such sales are in a different category from the interest which is paid upon them.
The tax upon the bonds themselves or the interest is a tax which falls upon the owner
merely by virtue of his ownership of the bonds, whereas a tax upon the profits is in
the nature !f an excise, resulting from the combination of several factors, which in-
cludes, not alone the original investment of capital, but also a certain amount of busi-
ness ability on the part of the purchaser. It cannot be contended, therefore, that such
a tax is a tax upon the obligations of the state. Neither can it be contended that the owner
of the bonds in making the purchase and sale is acting as an instrumentality or agent of
the state. It is not a transaction made on behalf of the state. On the contrary, the owner
of the bonds disposes of them a the most favorable time in order to advance his own
personal gain. He is not discharging any duty which rests upon the state; neither is he
exercising a power which belongs to the state. He is merely acting for and on behalf
of himself in the conduct of an ordinary business transaction.
Since such a tax as the one in question is not a tax upon the obligations of the
state, and since the owner of the bonds, in making the sale, is not an instrumentality
or agent of the state, can it be reasonably contended that the tax substantially inter-
feres with the exercise of the borrowing power of the state? It would seem that this
question should be answered in the negative. To show that there was not such an
interference, the Supreme Court argued that uniform and long established practice
indicated that neither the Federal Government nor the states have found a tax on
the profits of the sales of their securities to be a burden on their power to borrow
money; that such profits are included within the meaning of "gains, profits, and in-
come"; and that such has been the construction placed upon the words by administra-
tive authorities. The Court further said that no state had yet complained of the
tax as burdening the exercise of its power.' 3 It is, of course, a mere matter of specu-
lation as to what effect the prospect of such a tax would have upon the investing
public. At the trial of the principal case, no actual consequences were shown, but
the court said it was a matter of common knowledge that bonds were purchased for
profit, and that it was a mere matter of conjecture as 'to the influence which the tax
in question would have upon the purchaser. That conjecture might be either way,
and conjecture, in itself, as to an unfavorable influence is certainly not sufficient to
establish that substantial impediment to the borrowing power of the state which is
necessary to invalidate the tax under the principles heretofore discussed.' Before the tax
should be held invalid, there should be a real burden imposed upon the state, and not
one which is merely speculative. Even conceding that there may possibly be some
injury to the borrowing power of the state, it still is of such negligible amount as
not to bring the case within the general rule that the Federal Government cannot tax
the state or its instrumentalities. J. W. P.
13. In this connection, it is interesting to sec.,rities, but even so, their appearance was
note that the states of New York and Massa- a concession, or at least an indication, that
chusetts appeared before the court in defense taxation of profits arising from the sale of the
of the tax. In all probability, their purpose bonds of -the state would not burden its bor-
was to secure the reciprocal right of taxing rowing power.
the profits arising from the sale of Federal
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST-Limitation of In-
surance Agents' Commissions. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., O'Gorman
& Young v. Phoenix Assur. Co., Ltd.1
Separate actions were brought by O'Gorman & Young, a domestic insurance
corporation licensed as an insurance broker, against the Hartford Insurance Company
and against the Phoenix Assurance Company, Limited, both being licensed foreign
fire insurance companies, to recover a balance for services alleged to be due. In each
case, the services performed were those of local agents at Newark, New Jersey, after
the effective date of the following statute: "In order that rates for insurance against
the hazards of fire shall be reasonable it shall be unlawful for any such insurer licensed
in this State [New Jersey] to . . . allow . . . any commission . . . in excess of a reason-
able amount, to any person for acting as its agent in respect to any class of such in-
surance, nor . . . to allow, any commission . . . to any person for acting as its local
agent in respect to any class of such insurance, in excess of that . . . allowed to any
one of its local agents on such .risks in this State."2 In the one case, there was a
contract made prior to the effective date of the above statute to pay 25% of the
premiums. In the other, there was a contract, consummated after that date, to pay
a reasonable value for such services. In the latter case, it was alleged that 25% is
a reasonable value for such services. In each the complaint alleged that 20% had been
paid. The defense, under the statute, in each case, was that local agents within the
state were paid only 20%. By the statute, as 20% was all that was paid to some of the
local agents in the state, 20% would be the limit demandable for services of that nature.
The United States Supreme Court, in sustaining the defense, held that the statute
w7s no denial of due process.
In dealing with the constitutionality of the statute in quesion, it is necessary to keep
in mind that the right to contract freely has been held to be one of the incidents of liberty
provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment,3 an infringement of which is to be guard-
ed against. This right, however, is not absolute.4 It is subject to being interfered
with-by the legitimate exercise of the states' police power.5
A state, in the exercise of this power, by reasonable legislation, may regulate
and control businesses which are affected with public use or interest. In the decision
1. 51 S. Ct. 130 (1930).
2. N. J. Laws 1928, c. 128, p. 258.
3. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105,
111, 49 S. Ct. 57, 73 L. Ed. 204 (1928); Ribnik
v. McBride. 277 U. S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545, 72
L. Ed. 913, 56 A.L.R. 1327 (1927); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 545, 546, 43
S. Ct. 394, 397, 67 L. Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238
(1923); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S.
418, 434, 47 S. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718, 58
A.L.R. 1236 (1926); Wolff Co. v. Industrial
Court, 262 U. S. 522, 43, S. Ct. 630, L. Ed.
1103, 27 A.L.R. 1280 (1922); Meyer v. Nebras-
ka, 262 U. S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed.
1043, 29 A.L.R. 1446 (1922); Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312, 338, 42 S. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed.
254, 27 A.L.R. 375 (1921); Adams v. Tanner,
244 U. S. 590, 37 S. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336,
L.R.A. 1917 F, 1163, Ann Cas. 1917 D, 973
(1916); Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 S.
Ct. 298, 61 L. Ed. 755, L.R.A. 1917 E, 938,
Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 1024 (1916); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 14, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L.
Ed. 441, L.R.A. 1915, C. 960 (0O14; Adair
v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 174, 175, 28 S.
Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764
(1907); Allger v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578,
589, 17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832, 835 (1897).
4. Atlantic Coast Line Ry Co. v. Goldsboro,
232 U. S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 364, 58 L. Ed. 721
(1914); New York Ry. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U.
S. 567, 14 S. Ct. 437, 38 L. Ed. 269 (1894).
5. M1unn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L.
Ed. 77 (1876). Here the interference with the
freedom of contract was upheld where the
owner had impressed his business with a public
interest.
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of Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas,6 Mr. Chief
Justice Taft said:
"In the language of the cases, the owner by devoting his business
to the public use, in effect grants the public an interest in that use and
subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest, at-
though the property continues to belong to its private owner, and to be
entitled to protection accordingly."
In other words, the state may interfere to a certain extent with such a business
when the interest of the public demands it. In regard to this control, the legislature
necessarily has a large discretion, not only as to what the interest requires, but as to the
manner of guarding these interests as well. Without such control, the owner of such
property could compel the public to yield to his own terms or forego the use.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in the Kansas Industrial Court case, divided businesses
affected with such an interest into three groups:
"1. Those which are carried on under the authority of a public
grant of privilege which either expressly or impliedly imposes the
affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any mem-
ber of the public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers, and
public utilities. 2. Certain occupations regarded as exceptional, the
public interest attaching to which, recognized from the earliest times,
has survived the period of arbitrary parliamental or colonial legisla-
tion for regulating all trades and callings. Such are those of the keep-
ers of inns, cabs, and gristmills ... 3. Businesses which, though not
public at their inception, may be fairly said to have risen to be such,
and have become subject in consequence to some government regula-
tion. They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public
that this is superimposed upon them."
It is not difficult to say that insurance companies involve a public interest within
the third category. As is necessary by their very nature, they are immense organiza-
tions. In much the same way as are the common carriers and public utilities, they are
controlled by powerful financial interests. A great part of the country's wealth sub-
ject to destruction is protected by insurance. Their efficiency and solvency are, there-
fore, of public concern.
The case of German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis 7 is the leading case in the
United States laying down the rule that insurance companies are affected with a public
interest and that as such they may invoke and require governmental supervision. This
question is no longer an open one in most states. The same conclusions is almost uni-
versal in state court holdings.8
6. 262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630 (1922). W. 127 (1917); Ex parte Carlson, 262 P. 792
7. 233, U. S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 612, 58 L Ed. (Cal. App. 1928); Continental Life Ins. & In-
1011 (1913). vestment Co. v. Hattabaugh, .21 Idaho 285, 121
8. State ex rel. Mackey v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 681, P. 81 (1912) ; Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., v. Boys,
286 S. W. 363 (1926) ; State ex rel Waterworth 293 I1. 307, 127 N. 1,. 748 (1920); People v.
v. Harty, 278 Mo. 685, 213 S. W. 443 (1919); Continental Beneficial Ass'n, 204 11. App. 501,
Nalley v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S. W. 510, (1917) ; Glidden Co. v. Retail Hardware
769 (1913); Swinney v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Minn., 233 N. W. 310
Co. 8 S. W. (2d) 1090 (Mo. App. 1928) ; Carr v. (Minn. 1931) ; Strand v. Barbers' Life Ins. Co.
Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 28 Mo. App. 215 of Lincoln, 213 N. W. 349 (Nebr. 1927); Ber-
(1887); Mutual Relief Ass'n v. Parker, 287 S. stein v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 238 N.
W. 199 (Ark. 1926); Firemen's Ins. Co. of Y. S. 313, 135 Misc. Rep. 352 (1930); State 71.
Newark, N. J., v. Davis, 130 Ark. 576, 198 S. Conn, 115 Ohio St. 607, 155 N. E. 138 (1927);
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Although the principle be universally recognized, the precise difficulty presented
here is in determining the limits of this control. In answering the principal question
at issue,9 whether an insurance company's private character precludes the regulation
in question, it is necessary to weigh against the vague "due process" clause the nature
of the insurance business, its extent and importance, its relation to the life, health,
and welfare of the public, the existence or possible existence of monopolization, the
chance of oppression, the light in which it has been regarded by the public, and the
fact that legislatures of various states have stepped in and restrained the unlimited
exercise of such business.
As to this last element to be weighed, in the opinion of the German Alliance In-
surance Co. v. Lewis,10 Mr. Justice McI~enna said:
"Those regulations exhibit it to be the conception of the law-mak-
ing bodies of the country without exception that the business of insur-
ance so far affects the public welfare as to invoke and require govern-
mental regulation. A conception so general cannot be without cause."
The principal contention advanced for opposing the constitutionality of this
regulation is that up to this case, the extreme limit to which the United States
Supreme Court has ever been willing to go is to hold that because of the public in-
terest involved, reasonable rates for issuing fire insurance policies may be established
by statutes.
As indicated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, in delivering the opinion in the principal
case, in addition to that finding, the United States Supremej Court has held that the
states may go so far as to regulate the relations of those who are engaged in that
business. In the case of La Tourette v. McMaster,11 the United States Supreme Court
held that the states' powers over insurance companies extends to its agents and is
best executed when they are residents of the state. The Court in that case upheld
as constitutional a South Carolina act entitled "An act to provide for licensing of
insurance brokers" which provided, among other conditions, that only such persons
may be licensed as are residents of the state and have been licensed insurance agents
of the state for at least two years.
That the states may likewise regulate the relations of those engaged in the busi-
ness was held in Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.12 The Court there up-
held as constitutional the Oregon statute which, in effect, provides that in the applica-
tion of insurance, the persons who solicit and procure applications for insurance are to
be regarded in all matters relating to such applications as the agents of the company,
and not of the applicants, regardless of any provision in the policy to the contrary.
The case of German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewisla determined as law that the
states may regulate the rates of insurance. It is thought to reasonably follow from
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lillard, 248 P. servance of the "due process" clause. Inci-
84 (Okla. 1926); Herbung v. Lee, 269 P. 236 dental to that prohlem, and subordinate to it,
(Oregon, 1928); Munhall v. Travelers' Ins. Co., it raises the question as to whether the par-
150A. 645 (Pa. 1930); Continental Ins. Co. v. ticular means resorted to in New Jersey is
Fishback, 282 P. 44 (Wash. 1929); ,State v. constitutional.
Fowler, 220 N. W. 534 (Wis. 1928). 10. Supra, note 7, 233 U. S. 1. c. 412.
9. It should be noted that the problem 11. 248 U. S. 465, 39 S. Ct. 160, 63 L. Ed.
raised by this statute is really two-fold. First, 362 (1918).
it raises the question, with which this note is
principally concerned, of whether legislation 12. 277 U. S. 311, 320, 48 S. Ct. 512, 72
resulting in regulation of insurance agents' L. Ed. 895 (1927).
commissions is harmonious with a proper ob- 13. Case cited, supra, note 7.
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that holding that the state may also regulate insurance companies in the manner in-
volved in the statute of New Jersey by regulating the commissions due their agents.
The remuneration of the insurance agent, being a percentage of the premiums, is
directly related to the rate charged. An unreasonable commission may affect the public
in one of two ways,.both of which justify the invoking of governmental regulation.
The commission may be so large as to materially affect the adequacy of the rate charged
the insured. Excessive commissions may result in unreasonably high rate levels. On
the other hand, they may, through an attempt to comply with rate regulations, impair
the solvency of the company. When one considers that the insurance companies are
the machinery for distributing inevitable losses to a great portion of the nation's
wealth on the public, then it is self-evident that their financial stability must be
zealously guarded.
Again, lack of a uniform scale of commissions may encourage unfair discrimina-
tion among policy holders by facilitating rebating. This practice has led to the al-
most uniform passing of statutes forbidding rebating in all forms of insurance. 14
Recognizing that a large and increasing portion of the wealth of the country is pro-
tected by fire insurance, and that fire insurance agents have been, and probably will
continue, to discriminate in favor of some and against other applicants, it is desirable
to secure, as far as possible, to all persons, equality in the burdens of, as well as in
the benefits from such insurance. As to applicants of the same class and equal
risk, there should be no difference of premiums paid as well as there should be no
difference of dividends and benefits received. The public interest should be held
paramount to contentions that private management has been interfered with.
Assuming the constitutionality of a statute fixing the percentage of such commis-
sions, which seems proper, in determining whether the statute in question is con-
stitutional,' 5 it is necessary to consider a further question. Does the provision to the
effect that one can recover nothing in excess of the rate allowed another local agent
in the same class of insurance, although relying upon a contract fair upon its face
calling for more, conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment? It must be conceded that it
does not follow from the holding that the states may control insurance rates that they
may control every agreement having a possible relation thereto.- The mere right to
regulate a business does not empower the states to trespass on private management.' 6
It is contended that the provision goes beyond a mere regulation of the fire insurance
business and interferes with the private rights of insurance companies to conduct their
own private affairs. As underlying circumstances may condition the constitutionality
of an act, the prescribed method must be presumed to be reasonable until the con-
trary is made to appear. 17 As there was nothing shown in the facts and the argu-
14. Ala., Code .1907, Section 4579; II1., 17. Wampler v. Lecompte, 282 U. S. 172,
Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 73, section 27; Ind., 51 S. Ct. 92, 75 L. 1id. 121, (1931); Rast v.
Burn's Ann. St. 1914, section 4706f; Miss., Van Denman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357, 36
Code 1906, section 2600; N. J. Laws 1928, c. S. Ct. 370, 60 L. Ed. 679, L.R.A. 1917A, 421
128, p. 257; N. Y., Insurance Law (Consol. Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455 (1915); Chicago Dock
Laws 1909, c. 28) section 89; Ohio, section 1, Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 680, 687, 33 S. Ct.
90 Ohio Laws, p. 345; Tenn., Thompson's 715, 57 L. Ed. 1022 (1912) ; Lindsley v.
Shannon's Code, section 3312; Texas, Rev. St. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 79,
1911, article 4954; Wash., Laws 1911, p. 195, 83, 31 9. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369, Ann. Cas.
section 33; Wis., St. 1898, section 1955. 1912 C, 160 (1910); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127
15. See note 9. U. . 678, 685, 8 S. Ct. 992, 1257, 32 L. Ed.
16. Adams v. Tanner, supra, note 3; Truax 253 (1887); Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107
v. Corrigan, supra, note 3; Tyson & Bro. v. U. S. 466, 475, 2 S. Ct. 267, 27 L. Ed. 408
Banton, supra, note 3. (1882).
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ments of the case that evils, such as this provision was meant to remedy, do not exist
in New Jersey in regard to fire insurance companies, there is nothing to overcome
that presumption. From the fact that the New Jersey Legislature has so acted
and that the constitutionality of its action was upheld by the highest court of New
Jersey, it is easy to conclude that such evils do exist in that state.1 8
The determination of this case seems to carry the doctrine of a business affected
with a public interest somewhat further than the Court has been willing to go in the
past and appears to indicate a more liberal approach to the problem than has obtained
in recent years.1 9
B. H.
LIABILITY OF A PARENT OWNER OF AN AUTOMOBILE.-Roark v. Stone.1
The defendant's minor son, under sixteen years of age, was driving his
father's automobile to school when, due to negligent driving, he collided with
the plaintiff's car driven by the plaintiff. There was evidence that the
father had bought the car for family use, and that the son was accustomed to driving
it. The plaintiff contended that the owner of a motor vehicle who intrusts it into the
hands of an incompetent driver, or to a person deemed incompetent tinder the statute
on account of lack of age, is liable for injuries resulting from such driver's negligence.
The Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against
both the father and the son, predicating the father's liability upon the statute which
provides that it is unlawful for any minor under the age of sixteen to operate a
motor vehicle on the highways.2
The particular point has never been passed upon before in this state, and the
court based its opinion chiefly upon the result reached by a Nebraska court, 3 which
said, concerning the Nebraska statute4 prohibiting minors under sixteen years of age
from operating a motor vehicle: "The clear and unmistakable intent of the Legislature
in enacting the Nebraska statute under consideration was to protect persons and
property from the injury and damage that experience had shown were more likely to
be occasioned by the driving of motor vehicles by persons under sixteen years of
age, than would be occasioned by the driving of motor vehicles by persons of more
mature judgment; and when a person wilfully permits his minor child, under sixteen
years of age, to drive his automobile upon the public highways, in direct violation of
this statute, such permission and such violation of the statute constitutes in him such
negligence as is by the direct sequence of events the proximate cause of any damage
that may be sustained by another to his person or property when the other elements of
actionable negligence are established." This is practically the result of the instant
case. The Nebraska court has, in effect, said that the violation of the statute by the
father was negligence per se. In support of the Nebraska doctrine the Missouri court
said: "If the statute prohibiting the use of a motor vehicle by a minor under sixteen
years of age is to have any effect whatever, the father who knowingly permits such
18. Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 71 L. Ed. 718 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277
265, 268, 39 S. Ct. 273, 63 L. Ed. 597 (1918); U. S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 438, 37 S. (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.
Ct. 435, 61 L. Ed. 830, Ann Cas. 1918A. 1043 S. 235, 48 S. Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed. 287 (1929).
(1916); Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 452, 1. 30 S. W. (2nd) 647 (Mo. App. 1930).
35 S. Ct. 892, 59 L. Ed. 1400 (1914). 2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) sec. 7783 (i).
19. Cf. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 3. Walker v. Klopp, 99 Neb. 794, 157 N. W.
37 S. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336 (1917); Tyson 962 (1916).
& Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 426, 4. Neil. COMP. STAT. (1922) see, 8391.
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violation of the law, and whose negligence in so doing makes it possible for the child
to cause an injury, must be held liable on account of such negligent act."5
Absent statute a parent is not liable as such for the torts of his minor children,
whether those torts are wilful or negligent. 6 He is liable only on the same grounds
that he would be liable for the wrong of any other person, as, that he directed or
ratified the act, or took the benefit of it, or that the child was at the time acting as
his servant or agent.7 The relation of parent and child is a peculiar one,8 and, al-
though the relation 'contemplates control by tho parents, it does not mean that there
is absolute direction, as is the case in a true master and servant relationship. And it
can hardly be said that a parent by permitting his minor son to operate the auto-
mobile can anticipate that an injury will result. Common experience is to the contrary.
Although there is no common law liability placed upon the parent as such for
the torts of his minor child, the courts have created a liability in the parent for
automobile injuries on one of three theories independent of statutory provisions.
The three doctrines of liability are, the strict agency doctrine, the family purpose doc-
trine, and the doctrine of liability for the use of dangerous instrumentalities. 9
To invoke the agency doctrine of respondeat superior as applies to a master and
servant, agent and principal, or employee and employer relationship, it must appear
5. Supra note 1, 1. c. 649.
6. Mount v. Naert, 253 S. W. 966 (Mo,
1923); Bolman v. Bullene, 200 S. W. 1068
(Mo. 1918); Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200
S. W. 286 (1917); Needles v. Burk, 81 Mo.
569, 51 Am.- Rep. 251 (1884); Paul v. Hummel,
43 Mo. 119, 97 Am. Dec. 381 (1868); Baker v.
Haldeman, 24 Mo. 219, 69 Am. Dec. 430
(1857); Sartin v. Saling, 21 Mo. 387 (1855);
Curtis v. Harrison, 253 S. W. 474, (Mo. App.
1923); Llywelyn v. Lowe, 239 S. W. 535 (Mo.
App. 1922); Buskie v. Januchowsky, 218 S.
W. 696 (Mo. App. 1920); Mays v. Fields, 217
S. W. 589 (Mo. App. 1920); Bright v. Thatcher,
202 Mo. App. 301, 215 S. W. 788 (1919);
Bassett v. Riley, 131 Mo. App. 676, 111 S. W.
596 (1908); Lamb v. Davidson, 69 Mo. App.
107 (1897). And see Mast v. Hirsch, 199 Mo.
App. 1, 202 S. W. 275 (1918) ; Charlton v.
Jackson, 183 Mo. App. 613, 167 S. W. 670
(1914); (1900) 74 Am. St. Rep. 801, note;
Parker v. Wilson 179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150
(1912). But see Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo.
App. 415, 133 S. W. 351 (1911). Under the
Civil Law a parent is liable as such for the
torts of his minor children. Doumeing v.
Haydel, 9 La. *446 (1835); Hagerty v. Powers,
66 Cal. 368, 5 Pac, 622, 56 Am. St. Rep. 101
(1885); 2 POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS (3rd ed. 1853)
34. See note (1914) 5 U. OV Mo. BULL. LAW
SER. 30 (commenting on Hays v. Hogan),
For dangerous weapons see cases 29 Cyc.
1666. Parent is not liable for child's slander
out of his presence. Pauley's Guardian v.
Draine, 9 Ky. L. 693, 6 S. W. 329 (1888).
Statute expressly provides that neither parent
nor child shall be liable for the torts of the
other as such. OKLA. Comp. LAWS (1909) sec.
4914; McNeal v. McKain, 33 Okla, 449, 126
Pac. 742 (1912).
7. THROCKMORTON'S COOLEY ON TORTS (1930)
104. See Charlton v. Jackson; Paul v. Hum-
mel; Bassett v. Riley; Baker v. Haldeman, all
snpra note 6; SCHOULER, DOMESTIc RELATIONS
(6th ed. 1921) sec. 777. If parent pays for
damage caused by minor son he is not entitled
to recover the money. Needles v. Burke, supra
note 6. And see Taylor v. Stewart, 172 N. C.
203, 90 S. E. 134 (1916).
8. If parent knows of vicious propensities
of child, or incompetency, he is liable. Baker
v. Haldeman; Charlton v. Jackson, both supra
note 6; Meers v. McDowell, 110 Ky. 926, 62
S. W. 1013 (1901); Palm v. Ivorson, 117 Ill.
App. 535 (1901); Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S. D.
237, 76 N. W. 933 (1898). Parent is bound to
exercise his parental authority. Haverson v.
Nokker, 60 Wis. 511, 19 N. W. 382 (1884).
Family law is that the father is entitled to
minor child's wages, and there is no legal* sanc-
tion for assertion of a greater right by the
father against the child. Command is given
the father for maintenance and discipline. The
relation of master and servant invariably arises
out of a contract, express or implied. Liability
devolves upon the master on the idea that he
controls the manner of performance. The or-
dinary principles of master and servant have
no application to permissive use by a minor
child. Parker v. Wilson, supra note 6. But
see Paul v. Hummel, supra note 6.
9. See a discussion by Prof. Lattin, Vica-
rious Liability and the Family Automobile,
(1927) 26 MIcn. L. Rv. 846; McCall, The Fam-
ily Automobile, (1929) 8 N.C.L. Rtv. 256.
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that the son driving the automobile was not only the agent of his father, but also that
he was at the time of the accident acting within the delegated scope of his employment
in futherance of the interests and business of his father.1 0 A child driving a motor
vehicle to and from school can hardly be said to be concerned with the business of
his father. 1  An agency involves more than a mere involuntary subjugation of the
agent to his master's will as is found in the parent and child relationship.12 The
doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the facts in this case. The son
cannot be said to be discharging any duty of his parent simply because the parent per-
mitted him to drive the automobile to school. 13 The court in the instant case made
no pretense of basing liability upon agency principles.
The second theory upon which some courts have predicated liability on the par-
ent for his minor child's negligence in driving the family automobile is the "family
purpose doctrine." This doctrine of parent liability has received much favor in many
courts as being a true agency doctrine.1 4 As a matter of logic and fact, the family
purpose doctrine is diametrically opposed to the true principles of agency.1 5 Stated
briefly, the family purpose doctrine is that the father, by purchasing an automobile for
general family use, and placing it at the disposal of his family, for pleasure purposes,
makes the pleasure of his family his business, and any member of his family driving
the machine with his consent, express or implied, is the father's agent or servant. 16
The family purpose doctrine reaches a very desirable result in most cases on policy
by placing the liability for automobile accidents, which are not uncommon, upon
responsible shoulders. By application of this doctrine to the instant case the court
10. Supra note 6. O'Malley v. Construction
Co. 255 Mo. 386, 164 S. W. 565 (1914); Walker
v. Ry., 121 Mo. 575, 26 S. W. 360 (1894); Gar-
retzen v. Duenkel, 50 Mo. 104, 11 Am. Rep.
405 (1872); Sturgis v. Ry., 228 S. W. 861
(Mo. App. 1921); Fleischman v. Ice & Fuel
Co., 148 Mo. App. 117, 127 S. W. 660 (1910);
Evans v. Dyke Auto Co., 121 Mo. App. 226,
101 S. W. 1132 (1906); Johnson v. City of
St. Joseph, 96 Mo. App. 663, 71 S. W. 106
(1902); Perry v. McLaughlin, 287 Pac. 354
(Cal. 1930). Master is not liable for acts of his
servant outside the scope of his employment,
with or without master's permission. Core
v. Resha, 140 Tenn. 408, 204 S. W. 1149
(1918).
11. But see Mebas v. Werkmeister, 299
S. W. 601 (Mo. App. 1927).
12. Parker v. Wilson, supra note 6.
13. Daughter sixteen permitted to use
family car to get a pair of her own shoes
from repair shop was held to be an agent
of the father. The court, however, favored
the family purpose doctrine. Graham v. Page,
300 I. 40, 132, N. E. 817 (1921). It is a
question for the jury whether the minor son
driving family car to school was agent of
father. Curtis v. Harris, supra note 6. Minor
son seventeen who habitually drove family car
to and from school was held to be an agent
of his father in the commendable undertaking
to school the boy above the compulsory age
of fourteen. Mebas v. Werkmeister, supra
note 11. Son seventeen was held to be an
agent of father in taking father's car to buy
himself a hat with money furnished by the
father since it is father's duty to provide
clothing. Kichefsky v. Wiatrzykowsky, 210 N.
W. 679 (Wis. 1926). Minor son driving car
furnished by parent for his health was held to
be the agent of his parent. Fox v. Cahorowsky,
66 Pa. Super. Ct. 221 (1917).
14. Marshal v. Taylor, 168 Mo. App. 240,
153 S. W. 527 (1913); Daily v. Maxwell,
supra note 6: cf. Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md.
380, 116 Atl. 645 (1922).
15. See Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629
(1918); Mast v Hirsch, supra note 6; (1914) 5
U. or Mo. BULL. LAW SeR. 30.
16. "The doctrine contended for amounts
to this: The pleasure of the family in its ut-
most detail is the business of the father."
Parker v. Wilson, supra note 6, L.e. 368. The
family purpose doctrine involves five elements: (1)
general or special property in the family car
in the parent; (2) car furnished by parent for
family use; (3) family relation between the
driver and the owner of the car; (4) permissive
use; and (5) accident while car being used for
one of the permissive uses intended. Lattin,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 857.
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would have reached the same result as it did under the statute.' 7 The objections to
this doctrine as a rule of law are readily apparent,' 8 and have been recognized by a
great many courts. 10 The Missouri Supreme Court in the case of Hays v. Hogan,
20
after a careful review of all of the authorities, expressly denied the family purpose
doctrine, because it places an unnatural liability on the owner of an automobile. 21 The
effect of the instant case is to create a result not unlike the family purpose doctrine,
at least as far as it concerns the liability of a parent who permits his minor child
under the age of sixteen to drive his car. It is apparent that the tendency in many
states is to shift the liability, or to place the extreme responsibility upon the owner
of the motor vehicle.
The third theory upon which the father's liability for his minor son's negligent
driving may be placed is the liability of one owning a known dangerous instrumentality
which he surrenders to another's control.2 2 If the motor car were a dangerous instru-
mentality per se23 there would be no difficulty in justifying the result of this case,
since the legislature has deemed the minor under sixteen years of age incompetent
as a matter of law to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways. But it has
17. Under the family purpose doctrine the
parent is liable for any permissive use by a
member of his family. In the instant case
the minor son driving had his father's permis-
sion to use the automobile in going to and
from school.
18. "It bases the creation of a master and
servant relation upon the purpose which the
parent had in mind in acquiring ownership
of the vehicle, and its permissive use by the
child. This proposition ignores an essential
element in the creation of that status as to
third persons, that such use must be in fur-
therance of, and not apart from, the master's
service and control, and fails to distinguish
between a mere permission to use and a use
subject to the control of the master and con-
nected with his affairs." Doran v. Thompson,
76 N. J. L. 754, 762, 71 Ati. 296 (1908). "As ap-
plied to the case in hand it means that the
son in pursuit of his own pleasure with an
automobile owned by his father, was engaged
in the business of his father. But the doctrine,
we think, has no firm foundation in reason or
common sense." Parker v. Wilson, supra note 6.
179 Ala., I.e. 368 et seq.
19. See cases cited in Hays v. Hogan, supra
note 6.
20. Supra note 6.
21. Parker v. Wilson, supra note 6. The
rule in Hays v. Hogan, supra note 6, was held
not to apply where a minor son seventeen
habitually drove the family automobile to and
from school. Mebas v. Werkmeister, supra
note 11. But despite conflicts in the courts
the rule of Hays v. Hogan was held to apply.
Curtis v. Harrison, supra note 6.
22. The owner converts his automobile into
a dangerous instrumentality when he intrusts
it into the hands of an incompetent driver.
Lang Floral Co. v. Sheridan, 245 S. W. 467
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922). The four elements
necessary for liability of the owner of a
dangerous instrumentality are: (1) permission
to use; (2) incompetency of the one using;
(3) owner's knowledge of the incompetency;
(4) negligence of the one using is the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Jones v. Harris,
122 Wash. 69, 210 Pac. 22 (1922). An auto-
mobile is not a dangerous instrumentality when
intelligently managed. The owner should
know the qualifications of his driver. Staple-
ton v. Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N. W.
520 (1917). The automobile is not a danger-
ous instrumentality unless it is in the hands
of an incompetent operator. Rush v. Mc-
Donnell, 214 Ala. 47, 106 So. 175 (1925).
Liability attaches to the owner where he in-
trusts the dangerous potentialities of an auto-
mobile to an inexperienced child or servant;
the owner is negligent in so intrusting. Parker
v. Wilson, supra note 6. Incompetency of
the driver converts an automobile into a
dangerous instrumentality and the owner is
liable for intrusting to incompetent hands.
Gardner v. Solomon, 200 Ala. 115, 75 So.
621 (1917).
23. An automobile is a peculiarly dangerous
instrumentality. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v.
Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). For
the nature of a dangerous instrumentality see
Barmore v. Ry Co., 85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 210
(1904); Horack, The Dangerous Instrument
Doctrine (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 224. An auto-
mobile is not dangerous per se. Core v. Resha
supra note 10. The legislature has recognized
that the automobile is a dangerous instrumen-
tality. Seleine v. Wisner, 200 Iowa 1389,
206 N. W. 130 (1915).
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been settled in Missouri that an automobile is not dangerous per sC24 unless materially
defective.21
The principal criticism of this case comes from the court's construction of the
statute, following the construction given by the Nebraska court to a Nebraska statute. 26
The court's construction in the instant case appears to go beyond necessity and to
amount to judicial legislation.27 The court ruled that the father was guilty of violat-
ing the statute by permitting his son to operate his automobile on the highway; that
the violation of the statute was negligence; and that such negligence made it possible
for the child to cause the injury complained of. Accepting as a rule of law that
violation of such a statute may be negligence per se, 2s the problem is whether the
24. Michael v. Pulliem, 215 S. W. 763
(Mo. App. 1919) (per Woodson, C. J. and
Graves, J., who sat in Hays v. Hogan, supra
note 6); Evans v. Dyke Auto Co., supra note
10. "The automobile is not of itself neces-
sarily a dangerous agency, like an animal
ferae naturae, so that it cannot be driven on
the highways, nor is it a Juggernaut, purpose-
ly constructed to crush out the lives of men,
but by reason of its great weight and the power
with which it may be propelled, it becomes ex-
ceedingly dangerous unless the highest degree
of care and caution is used by the driver."
Jackson v. So. Hell Telephone C., 281 M.
358, 371, 219 S. W. 655 (1920) (The court was
influenced by the statute which required the
highest degree of care in driving a motor
vehicle, LAws 1911, p. 330, subsec. 9; repealed
by LAWS 1917, p. 404, sec. 1; and re-enacted
by LAWS 1921 (Ex. Ses.), p. 91, sec. 19). See
note (1920) 18 U. or Mo. BULL. LAW SIM. 48.
An automobile is a highly dangerous piece of
machinery. Meenach v. Crawford, 187 S. W.
879, 883 (Mo. 1916); Ex Parte Kneedler,
243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983 (1912); Hall v.
Compton, 130 Mo. App. 681, 108 S. W. 1122
(1908); McFern v. Gardiner, 121 Mo. App.
1, 97 S. W. 972 (1906). An automobile care-
lessly driven is a dangerous instrumentality.
Daily v. Maxwell, supra note 6; HUDDY, AUTO-
MOBILES (4th ed. 1916) sec. 30; 28 Cyc. 25.
25. Texas Co. v. Veloz, 162 S. W. 377
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913); 1 THOMPSON, NOGLI-
GENCE (2nd ed. 1901) sec. 533.
26. Walker v. Klopp, supra note 3.
27. The statute in question in the instant
case is part of that general chapter of the
statutes entitled Motor Vehicles, which was en-
acted to be "exclusively controlling on * * *
regulation, operation * * * their use on the
public highways * * * and on the regulation
of traffic on the highways of this state." This
chapter is merely a regulatory provision in the
exercise of the police power, designating the
proper way to handle motor vehicles. The
chapter is extensive and should be construed
to contain all of the provisions intended by the
legislature. Mo. Rev. STAT. (1929) sec. 7758.
28. "The violation of a valid and applicable
city ordinance restricting the speed of trains
is negligence per se, and substantial evidence
of such violation plus like evidence of a casual
connection between such negligence and an
injury is sufficient to sustain a verdict against
the violator, all issues being properly submitted,
unless contributory negligence appears as a
matter of law." Hunt v. St. Louis & S. F. R.
Co. 262, 271, 275, 171 S. W. 64 (1914).
The violation of a statute is either: (1) neg-
ligence per se; (2) only evidence of negligence;
or (3) prima facie evidence of negligence.
The proper intent of the legislature is carried
out if the violation is regarded as negligence
per se. To say the violation of a statute is
evidence of negligence, is to submit to the jury
when and to what extent it is reasonable to
break the law. Thayer, Public Wrong and
Private Action, (1913) 27 HARv. L. REv. 317;
(1915) 8 U. or Mo. BULL. LAW Sos. 46.
Propuolenis v. Goebel Construction Co., 279
Mo. 358, 213 S. W. 792 (1919). (Failure of
duty imposed by statute is negligence per se,
and it is not necessary to allege particular acts
of negligence; otherwise the statute would be
of no effect). "It may be said, then, that it
was a rule of law in this state, at the time of
the trial, that violation of a reasonable ordi-
nance regulation of speed was negligence per
se. That doctrine, somewhat shaken at one time,
but never exploded may now be taken as so
buttressed by both reason and authority to
withstand any but legislative assault." Stotler
v. Ry., 200 Mo. 107, 121, 98 S. W. 509 (1906)
(per Lamb, C. J.); Sluder v. St. Louis Transit
Co., 189 Mo. 107, 88 S. W. 648 (1905); Dahl-
strom v. Ry., 108 Mo. 525, 18 S. W. 919
(1891); Gratiot v. Ry., 16 S. W. 384 (Mo.
1891); Dickinson v. Ry., 104 Mo. 491, 16
S. W. 381 (1891) Wilkins v. Ry., 101 Mo. 93,
13 S. W. 893 (1890); Murray v. Ry., 101
Mo. 236, 13 S. W. 817 (1890); Kellny v.
Ry., 101 Mo. 67, 13 S. W. 806 (1890). Ev-
eryone on the street has a right to presume
the ordinance will be obeyed. Schlereth v. Ry.,
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Missouri statute properly relates to a parent who owns an automobile and permits his
son to drive it, so as to establish negligence on the part of the parent.
In the field of automobile liability there are, in general, five types of statutes
29
enacted by the various state legislatures. These five types which serve roughly to
group the various statutes are: (1) statutes which create a lien on the motor vehicle
involved in an accident to secure satisfaction for the damages sustained;30 (2) statutes
which prohibit minor children under a certain age from driving, and which, in ad-
dition, provide that no owner shall permit such a minor to operate his motor vehicle
on the highways; 31 (3) statutes which impose direct liability upon the owner of a
motor vehicle for any injuries caused by negligent driving where he consented to the
driving; 3 2 (4) statutes which require every owner of a motor vehicle to take out some
96, Mo. 509, 10 S. W. 66 (1888); Eswin v. Ry.,
96 Mo. 290, 9 S. W. 577 (1888); Keim v
Ry., 90 Mo. 314, 2 S. W. 427 (1886); Berg-
-man v. Ry., 1 S. W. (Mo.) 384 (1886); Karle v.
Ry., 55 Mo. 476 (1874); Lenz v. Siebert, 259 S.
W. 829 (Mo. App. 1924); Ashby v. Elsberry
Cravel Co., 99 Mo. App. 178, 73 S. W. 229
(1903). Skinner v. Stifel, 55 Mo. App. 9
<1893). The rule of ordinary care finds no
application where there is a statutory pro-
vision. Lilly v. State of W. Va., 29 F. (2d)
,61 (1928). It is negligence per se for a child
-under sixteen to operate a motor vehicle in
violation of a statute prohibiting a minor under
sixteen from so doing. Taylor v. Stewart, 172
N. C. 203, 90 S. 1E. 134 (1916); note (1907)
5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 187 Cf: Durant v. Lexing-
ton Mining Co., 97 Mo. 62 (1888). Maher v.
Railway, 64 Mo. 267 (1876). But see Henderson
v. Ry., 248 S. W. 987 (Mo. App. 1923), aff'd.,
314 Mo. 414, 284 S. W. 788 (1926); Barret v.
Delano, 174 S. W. 181 (Mo. 1915); Voelker
Products Co. v.-Ry., 170 S. W. 332 (Mo. 1914).
29. The classification is made for the con-
venience of discussion, and it is not pretended
-to be exhaustive. For a discussion of the
Louisiana Statute which makes the parent
civilly liable for his child's torts see Maloney
v. Goelz, 12 La. Ann. 31, 124 So. 606 (1929).
30. TeNN. LAWs 1905, c. 173, seec. 5 (- * *
there shall be created a lien on the motor
vehicle injuring for any and all damages the
-court may award, whether the driver is the
owner, chauffeur, agent, employee, servant, or
-any other person using the motor vehicle for
loan, hire, or otherwise.") Held not to create
-any new personal liability, but was simply a
lien against the automobile. Core v. Resha,
supra note 10. AcTs S. C. 1912 (27 ST. AT
LARGr, p. 737) (" * * injury by a motor ve-
hicle driven in violation of law, or negligently
and carelessly creates a lien on the motor
vehicle next in priority to a lien for taxes, and
the party injured may attach the motor vehicle,
'* * except when the car is stolen under lock
from a locked building.") Statute declared
com-stitutional under police power. Makes no
difference whether the owner consented to the
driving or not, since the statute is notice to
all the world. An owner parts with possession
of his automobile at his own peril. Merchant's
and Planter's Bank v. Brigman, 106 S. C. 362,
91 S. F. 332 (1916).
31. N. C. LAws 1923, c. 202, see. 1, p. 514
(Any person who, being owner or in charge
of any motor vehicle, authorizes or knowingly
permits a person under sixteen years of age
to operate such motor vehicle along any public
highway or street in the state shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor). ALA. ACTS 1911. sec. 22 p.
634, ALA. CiV. CODE (1923) sec. 6268 ("."and
any person allowing any such vehicle to be
operated by any person under the age of six-
teen years of age unless accompanied by such
adult shall be punished by a fine, etc.") Rush
v McDonnell, supra note 22. Statute con-
strued to make such minor conclusively incom-
petent to drive. Paschall v. Sharp, 215 Ala.
304, 110 So, 387 (1925). For the Nebraska
statute see supra note 4. See a discussion of
a similar statute in Kansas in Burrell v. Hor-
chem, 117 Kan. 678, 232 Pac. 1042 (1926).
PA. LAWS 1919, No. 283, sec. 3, p. 678, pro-
vides that no person under the gae of sixteen
shall be licensed to operate a motor vehicle, and
that no owner or custodian of a motor vehicle shall
permit any person under the age of sixteen
to operate such a vehicle. Laubach v. Colley,
283 Pa. 366, 129 Atl. 88 (1925). As amended,
PA. LAWS 1925, No. 160, sec. 9, p. 276, provides
that the owner or one having control of the
motor vehicle who c,uses or permits such motor
vehicle to be operated contrary to the provisions
of the statute shall be deemed equally guilty
of a misdemeanor with the operator for any
violation thereof.
32. IOWA CoD4 (1924) sec. 5026 ("**the
owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for
any negligence of one operating the vehicle
with his consent.") Maine v Maine Co., 198
Iowa 1278, 201 S. W. 20, 37 A.L.R. 161
(1924); cf. Seleine v. Wisner, supra note 23
(Coverture prevented working of statute). For
the amended Pennsylvania statute see supra
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sort of liability insurance before he is permitted to drive ;3 (5) statutes which mere-
ly limit the age at which a person may operate a motor vehicle, and which do not in
any way by their terms apply to the owner of the motor vehicle.3 4 It will be seen
that these types of statutes differ materially in their applications and in the results
reached under them. It will be observed also that the law in each particular state prior
to the enactment of a particular statute varied materially between the states,3 5 and
should have some effect on the construction which is put on the particular statute.
The general question to ask in any case is, what was the intention of the legislat ure
in passing the particular law.3 6  In general it may seem that the purpose of the
statutes is to place the liability for automobile accidents upon the shoulders of the
owner who is more likely to be a responsible person and more able to satisfy the
liability. There can be no doubt of such an intent in the lien statutes. The legislature
has expressly provided in those statutes that the motor vehicle involved
shall be attached by a lien to secure satisfaction of the damages.3 7 In the second type
of statutes, the legislature has provided not only the age limit, but also has expressly
added that "no owner, manufacturer or dealer shall permit a minor to operate his
motor vehicle."38  Concerning the Nebraska statute, the Nebraska court said that the
clear and unmistakable intent of the legislature was to protect persons from, injury
likely to be occasioned by minor drivers, and if a parent permitted his minor son
to operate his car he was guilty of a violation of the statute, such as amounted to
negligence per se.39 In that case both the parent and the child were guilty of a viola-
note 31. The Michigan statutes have under-
gone peculiar developments, influenced both by
the legislature and the court. The original
statute placed an absolute liability on the
owner of a motor vehicle except when oper-
ated by a thief. This statute was declared
unconstitutional, and following, the legislature
passed two other statutes, each lessening the
liability. MICH. PUB. AcTs (1909) Act- 318
sec. 10, subd. 3; Daugherty v. Thomas, 174
Mich. 444, 134 N. W. 468 (1913); Micr. COMp.
LAWS (Cahill, 1915) see. 4825; Hawkins v.
Ermatinger, 211 Mich. 578, 179 N. W. 249
(1920); Bowerman v. Sheehan, 242 Mich. 95,
219 N. W. 69 (1928). MICH. COMP. LAws
(1929) sec. 4648.
33. Notes (1930) 69 A.L.R. 397; (1925)
39 A.L.R. 1028.
34. WIS. STAr. (1927) sec. 8508, provides
that no person under the age of sixteen, unless
accompanied by an adult, shall operate any
motor vehicle on any highway of the state.
N. C. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (1919) see. 2614, pro-
vides that no person shall operate a motor ve-
hicle upon the public highways of the state
who is under the age of sixteen. Taylor v.
Stewart, supra note 28, Linville v. Nissen,
162 N. C. 96, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) (Liability
under the statute arises from the parent's own
negligence, and not the imputed negligence of
the child). Ky. ST. SUPP. (1918) sec. 2739
g 30 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
one under the age of sixteen unless accom-
panied by a parent, guardian, or someone over
the age of twenty-one, who accompanies with
the consent of the parent or guardian, to oper-
ate a motor vehicle on the highways." Doss
v. Monticello Elec. Co., 193 Ky. 499, 236 S.
W. 1046 (1922).
35. Following is a classification suggested
by Prof. Lattin as to whether the states
follow the family purpose doctrine, the strict
agency doctrine or some other principle affect-
ing the liability of a parent owner of an auto-
mobile. This classification is independent of
statutory provisions.
The Family Purpose Doctrine: Ariz., Colo.,
Conn., Ga., Ill., Iowa, Ky., Minn., Neb., Nev.,
N. M., N. C., N. D., Ore., S. C., Tenn., Texas,
Wash., and W. Va.
The Strict Agency Doctrine: Ala., Ark., Cal.,
Del., Ind., Kan., Me., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Mo., Mont., N. J., N. Y., Ohio, Okla., Pa.,
R. I., Utah, Va., Wis., and Alberta.
Civil Law Liability: La.
Dangerous Instrumentality: Fla.
Doubtful: N. H., Idaho, S. D., Vt., Wyo.,
D. C., and Miss. Lattin, op. cit. supra'note 9.
36. The legislature intends only what it
says in the statute. Home Ins. Co. v. Wick-
ham, 281 Mo. 300, 219 S. W 961 (1920);
State ex rel Knisely v. Holtcamp, 181 S. W.
(Mo.) 1007 (1915); Clark v. K. C., St. L. & C.
R. Co. 219 Mo. 524, 118 S. W. 40 (1913).
37. Supra note 30.
38. Supra note 31.
39. Supra note 3.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
tion of the express prohibitions of the statute. The Nebraska court was no doubt cor-
rect in construing the legislative intent thus, and in applying the statute to the case.
In the third type of statutes the legislatures, in varying terms, have said that the
owner of the motor vehicle shall be liable in damages in any case of permissive use,40
whether by a minor or an adult. Since these statutes expressly and directly place the
liability, there is no problem of construction for the courts. The fourth type of statute
simply provides that any one seeking to register his motor vehicle for permission to
operate it must first provide security for damages in case of an accident,4 1 payable
to anyone who suffers injuries from the driving of the car either by the owner or by a
third party who has the owner's permission to operate the vehicle. The legislatures in
enacting that law very definitely put an anticipatory liability upon the owner of the
automobile. The fifth type of statute appears to be nothing more than a mere police
regulation. Some of these statutes merely provide that no person under a certain
age shall operate a motor vehicle on the highways unless accompanied by an adult.
4 2
No provision is made in these statutes concerning the owner's duties, nor concerning
restrictions placed upon him. Some of the courts have read into this type of statute
a prohibition aimed against the parent of a minor.43 Since these statutes make no
mention of parent liability, it is necessary for the court to look elsewhere to find
a liability.4 4 It is difficult to read into this particular type of statute the legislature's
purpose to place responsibility for an accident on the owner of a motor vehicle which
happens to be driven with his consent.
In enforcing a duly enacted statute the courts are justified in construing the
intent of the legislature inpassing the law. This construction must be had from the
terms of the statute itself in the face of existing rules of law. Where a statute changes
existing rules of law, the court should very carefully limit the change to the extent
the legislature intended.45  The intent of the legislature is indisputable in the first
four types of statutes listed above. In the fifth type of statute, under which the Mis-
souri statute may be said to fall, there is some room for construction by the court.
However, in those states where the family purpose doctrine is well established, such
a statute does not change the existing law. There the court should have no difficulty
in construing the meaning of the statute. There is already a liability on the parent
regardless of the age of the driver if he is a member of the immediate family. But
some states which avowedly deny the family purpose doctrine, and limit liability to a
40. Supra note 32.
41. Supra note 33.
42. Supra note 34.
43. Taylor v. Stewart, supra note 28; Lin-
ville v. Nissen, supra note 34 (The statute
provided that no person shall operate a motor
vehicle upon the highways of the state who
is under the age of sixteen). N. C. CONS.
STAT. ANN. (1919) see. 2614. It should be
noted that the statute was since changed to
directly prohibit an owner from permitting a
minor to operate his automobile. Supra note
31. Doss v. Monticello Elec. Co., supra note
34 (where the family purpose doctrine was
considered in connection with the statute).
Laubach v. Colley, supra note 31 (The statute
provided that no person, whether owner or
not, under the age of sixteen shall operate a
motor vehicle upon any public highway in the
commonwealth). A statute which merely pro-
hibited a minor under sixteen from operating
a motor vehicle was construed as making such
minor conclusively incompetent to drive, so
his parents are liable if they permit him to
drive. Paschall v. Sharp, supra note 34.
44. The court is forced to consider liabilty
on the common law principles prevailing prior
to the enactment of the statute.
See E. R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation, (1891)
5 HARv. L. Rev. 172, 199 et seq. "I recognize
without hesitation that judges do and must
legislate, but they can do so only interstitailly;
they are confined from molar to molecular mo-
tions. A common law judge could not say, 'I
think the doctrine of consideration is a bit of
historical nonsense, and I will not enforce it
in my court.' " Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
(per Holmes, 1-.) 244 U. S. 205, 221 (1917).
NOTES ON RECENT CASES
strict agency relation, have interpreted this type of statute to place definite liability
on the parent who permits his. minor child to drive the family car.46 The court in
the instant case is apparently willing to adopt that interpretation, even in the face
of a settled rule of law that the family purpose doctrine has no application in this
state. In each case of a statute similar to the Missouri statute the legislature has de-
clared it unlawful for the minor to operate the car on the highways. In each case the
legislature has prescribed a penalty for violation of the terms of the statute. It is,
undisputed that the operator himself will be liable for his negligence in operating the
motor vehicle. But no provision is made in the Missouri statute for either the parent
of the minor operating the vehicle in violation of the statute or for an owner other
than the parent. In some of the statutes it is provided that a parent or other adult must
accompany the minor to make the driving lawful.4 7 The Missouri statute does not
even make that provision. The Missouri statute provides in plain and unequivocal
terms that: "No person under the age of sixteen (16) years shall operate a motor
vehicle on the highways of this state."' 4 8 The penalty provided for a violation of this
provision is punishment by fine of from five to five hundred dollars, or imprisonment
in the county jail not exceeding two years, or both, such fine and imprisonment.4 9
No one would contend that this penalty should be enforced against the parent.
The court in the instant case flatly applied a familiar rule of law that violation
of a statute is negligence per .re. There can be no justification in this by referring to
statutes of an entirely different type wherein the legislature has very definitely placed
a liability upon the parent. If the Missouri legislature had intended a liability similar
to that found in the Nebraska case, it could easily have included a clause defining the
Iliability and its extent.
The result of this case, if not the reasoning, might be justified by accepting the
plaintiff's contention definitely that the statute declares the minor child incompetent
as a matter of law, so that the parent in permitting an incompetent driver to operate
his motor vehicle thereby converts it into a dangerous instrumentality and becomes re-
sponsible for all negligence. 50 This contention is no more than an exception to the
well established rule that an automobile is not an inherently dangerous instrumentality.
The owner must know of the incompetency, and the negligence of the driver must
result from that incompetency. Such a doctrine reasons backwards and denies the
dangerous character of the automobile while affirming it. It is not clear that the
court adopted this rule. This doctrine is readily justifiable where the statute has
placed a prohibition on the parent, for then the owner is negligent by the statute if he
surrenders his vehicle to one deemed incompetent under the statute. It is doubtful if
even this doctrine-can properly be applied under the Missouri statute.
No doubt the court in the instant case was concerned with the futility of a judg-
ment against the minor son. The court may have been looking harder for satisfaction
than for fault when it said that to give any effect whatever to the statute the father
must be held liable. But there is nothing in the wording of this statute interpreted in
the instant case, nor in the application of such a statute to existing common law
principles in Missouri to show that the legislature intended to establish negligence on
the part of a parent who owns an automobile, merely from the fact that he permitted
his minor child to drive the automobile.
N. L.V1.
46. Supra note 43. note 22; notes (1925) 36 A.L.R. 1138, 1152;
47. Supra note 34. 42 C. J. 1078; TORTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L.
48. Mo. Risv. STAT. (1929) sec. 7783 (i). Inst. 1929) sec. 184b. Hut see Allen v. Cog-
49. Mo. Rev. STAT. sec. 7784 (d). lizer, 208 S. W. 102 (Mo. App. 1919).
50. Lang Floral Co. v. Sheridan, supra

